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Abstract
We propose a novel consensus protocol based on a hybrid approach, that
combines a directed acyclic graph (DAG) and a classical chain of blocks.
This architecture allows us to enforce collective block construction, minimis-
ing the monopolistic power of the round-leader. In this way, we decrease
the possibility for collusion among senders and miners, as well as miners
themselves, allowing the use of more incentive compatible and fair pricing
strategies. We investigate these possibilities alongside the ability to use the
DAG structure to minimise the risk of transaction censoring. We conclude by
providing preliminary benchmarks of our protocol and by exploring further
research directions.
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1. Introduction
Most popular consensus protocols, such as Proof of Work (PoW) [1, 2]
and Proof of Stake (PoS) [3, 4] resemble a rent-seeking contest [5, 6] for the
right to create the next block. The contest usually consists of selecting a
participant from a population of miners, proportional to a costly sacrifice
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they have made, such as hashrate in PoW or stake in PoS. The winner gains
a monopoly to create the next block, meaning they are free to compose a
block of any available transactions they wish, within certain protocol limits
such as block size [7].
The high dependence of PoW mining on energy costs has led to a ge-
ographical concentration of miners in areas where energy is cheap, such as
China [8], while economies of scale and a high variance in rewards has led to
a further concentration of power in the hands of operators of mining pools
[9, 10, 11]. With this inherent progression towards centralisation there is a
rising threat that some users or transactions can be censored. This issue
represents a threat to “freedom of speech” in the context of on-chain gover-
nance mechanisms and a security threat in the form of punitive and feather
forking attacks [12, 13]. In addition selective transaction censoring can also
lead to manipulation of and security threats to financial protocols such as
decentralized exchanges [14].
As the security of a decentralised blockchain depends on the total mining
rewards (transaction fees and block rewards) [15, 16], the ability to extract
fees is essential to the system. Allowing users to freely decide on the fee at-
tached to their transaction is the current most popular approach. Given each
individual miner’s incentive to maximise the fees they can extract with their
block, this approach relies on restricting throughput on a protocol level to
generate fees [17, 18]. If block producers act as profit maximisers and select
transactions according to their fee, the most prevalent fee selection mecha-
nism (used by, among others, Ethereum and Bitcoin) can be characterised
as a generalized first price auction [1, 18, 19]. While numerous other mech-
anisms have been proposed, the monopoly of the block producer to select
transactions heavily constrains the mechanisms that can be employed: un-
less the block producer is awarded a hundred percent of the fees, the producer
can always gain by circumventing the protocol. Colluding with a transac-
tion sender through a third channel payment, the sender can simply pay the
block producer the original fee f − ǫ while sending the transaction with the
lowest possible fee ǫ to the network. On the other side of the spectrum we
can find algorithmic fee setting mechanisms. The main difficulty with these
approaches is that they have to internalise the externalities a transaction
is causing, which include system security, usage of computation, bandwidth
and storage as well as decentralisation.
The time propagation of blocks, for sizes larger than 20kB, is almost linear
with their size [20]. It can therefore be more profitable to mine empty blocks
2
in situations where the block reward is much larger than the sum of the
transaction fees and if there is a competition between soft forks, such as in
Bitcoin [8, 21]. This dynamic lowers the efficiency of the system and should
therefore be mitigated against in protocols aiming to maximise throughput.
One method to address this issue, as well as the censorship, could be to
increase the cost of creating a sub-optimal block to the producer by scaling
their rewards by the proportion of transactions included in their block.
Another problem with the incentive structure of many blockchain sys-
tems, such as Bitcoin and Ethereum, is the lack of incentive for nodes to
propagate transactions [22]. Information sharing is carried out by the nodes
in these networks, which may or may not additionally participate in mining,
and is not rewarded. This is therefore only sustainable when the cost of run-
ning a node is sufficiently low so that the system is able to maintain a large
population of nodes relative to miners. In directed acyclic graph (DAG) pro-
tocols the dynamic is slightly different as nodes have an incentive to gossip
transactions that build upon their own [23, 24].
The problems of censorship and limited fee pricing algorithms are to a
large part rooted in the monopoly over block construction. Here we will
propose a new way to collaboratively pack a block through the use of a
DAG, and to then discuss the implications and benefits of minimising the
block proposer’s freedom.
2. Literature review
The Prism consensus protocol [25] aims to maximise the transaction
throughput of a decentralised payment system by parallelising the task of col-
lecting transactions, producing blocks and reaching finality on the blockchain.
Although the idea of separating these processes has appeared in other pro-
tocols [26, 27, 28], very few completely divide all three. The Prism proposal
shares many similarities with our model described in Section 3. In particular,
they also maximise the throughput of the system by incentivising the sharing
of transactions sets, in their case in the form of transaction blocks, alongside
the block production, allowing block producers to propagate smaller final
blocks. However, their protocol does not use this to limit the censorship
power of the block producer, who is still free to create an empty block or a
block that contains only transactions of their own choice.
The model described in the next section builds upon protocols utilising
a decentralised round based random seed, which has been implemented in
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many protocols [29, 27, 30], through the introduction of a DAG. Here we
focus on the DFinity protocol which makes use of a verifiable random func-
tion (VRF) [31] to enable the notarisation of blocks by a committee in each
round. The system is designed to accommodate high throughput while being
resistant to various common attack vectors. Double-spend attacks involving
the withholding blocks, such as Finney attacks [32], are defended against, in
these systems, by requiring the notarisation of each block by a random com-
mittee in each round. The difficulty of such an attack is therefore increased
by the attacker now being being required to control 51% of the committee,
and having the highest-ranking block proposal. The protocol also detects
attacks involving network partitions and resolves these by either pausing the
protocol, preventing further blocks from being generated, or only continuing
on the majority branch [30].
The consensus protocols of IOTA [23] and Byteball [24] also make use of
a DAG as the structure naturally scales to accommodate a high transaction
throughput. In these protocols, users append their own transactions onto the
graph and in the process validate the transactions to which their transaction
is attached. In this way, IOTA is able to offer zero nominal transaction fees6
and the security of the system is maintained directly by its users. However,
despite its advantages, the DAG only defines a partial ordering of transactions
and therefore additional layers in the protocol are required to establish a
strict ordering of transactions. The strict ordering is necessary to implement
smart contracts and both those protocols rely on trusting a third party to
do so.
In the next section we show that by using the DAG, in combination with
the traditional chain structure, we can obtain a strict ordering of transactions
without relying on trusted parties.
3. Minimal agency consensus
We propose a model that constrains the monopolistic power of a block
proposer. The fundamental data structure that is used to record transaction
events is a DAG, that we denote as G = (V,E), where vi ∈ V are the
vertices that contain collections of transaction hashes and E represents the
6However, note that to submit transactions IOTA users must solve a PoW problem,
which is a cost on the transactor and serves a similar purpose to fees.
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set of edges. In this model each vertex has two out-going edges7, which are
hash-references to previous vertices. The tips of the DAG refer to vertices
with no in-coming edges. A DAG provides partial ordering in the sense that
the children of vi, the set of vertices that are both directly and indirectly
referenced by a specific vertex, vi, occurred with certainty in its past.
The ledger uses a decentralised random beacon (DRB) as a mechanism
to elect a committee C that collectively agree on the next block to be pub-
lished, similarly to other protocols that use a DRB [30]. The value of the
random beacon, sr, for the current round is also used to define a ranking
of staked nodes in the network which specifies their priority for being the
publisher of a block in the current round. We refer to members of this group
as vertex-proposers. Furthermore, in our model the random beacon selects a
set A of vertex-attachers. Each attacher has the right to append one vertex
to the DAG per round, containing a list of hash-references to all transactions
not yet included in any vertex in its past. At the end of a block round,
the highest ranked vertex-proposers can propose a number of vertices (and
thereby transactions) to be packed into the next block, which are then no-
tarised by the committee based on the proposer’s rank. In particular, each
vertex-proposer signs the following information: a proposed set of vertices,
previous block hash, and the hash of the Merkle tree of transactions in the
block. The signed proposals are propagated around the network and all com-
mittee members notarise the highest ranked proposals they receive. Under
certain assumptions, the protocol can then guarantee finalisation of a no-
tarised proposal after two rounds, based on the overall ranking of the blocks
in the different chains [30]. Once a proposal is finalised, each participant can
create the block of packed transactions, defined from the proposed vertices,
and can discard that part of the DAG structure that was included in the
block, creating very low additional memory requirements for participants.
Given the chosen vertices, further protocol-level constraints, e.g. on price
or block-size can then be imposed on the transaction if desired. Transac-
tions covered by the vertex-proposal that were not included in the block, can
then be carried over to the next round, be included again in new vertices or
rejected (leaving it to the sender to re-send them).
7In general, the vertex out-degree kout ≥ 2. The lower bound is chosen to minimise
additional storage requirements.
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To maximise system throughput with the DAG, the protocol has to in-
centivise:
i) attachers to build a compact DAG, which allows the proposers to max-
imise the descendants of any proposed set of vertices as much as possible
ii) the proposers to select the vertices maximising the number of descen-
dants
The minimal agency of the vertex-proposer is enforced by the collaborative
construction of the DAG, which links together groups of transactions, and in
incentivising vertex selection by ii). This latter constraint can be imposed in
various ways, each with a different cost of censorship to the vertex-proposer,
which are discussed in section 4. Note that, given honest actors, ii) should
be almost equivalent to selection by fee maximisation (with difference only
stemming from some participants not yet being aware of certain transac-
tions).
4. Results
In this section we detail previously unenforceable strategies that can be
employed with our model and how they can overcome the shortcomings out-
lined in section 1.
4.1. Fees
Fees in decentralised blockchain systems have two major purposes: first,
to secure the system by encouraging sufficient mining activity for the cost
of an attack to be high enough to deter attacks, and second, to distribute
new tokens. Here we are concerned with the ability to efficiently extract fees
to provide the necessary security. In this section we will deal with the more
difficult scenario where additional, inflation-financed, block rewards are not
present. Several of the most popular cryptocurrencies, including Bitcoin and
Ethereum 1.0, are based on a fixed total token supply, meaning any inflation
can only be temporary and will eventually need to approach zero. Unless the
system operates at its absolute transaction limit, the externalities between
a miner’s incentive to maximise their block reward and the social good of
system security8 imply that we cannot let the free market decide on both
8Further externalities stem from the requirement that all (future) miners will have to
compute and store the transaction, but the reward is only attributed to the block producer.
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block size and price of transactions [33]. To account for these inefficiencies,
the protocol has to impose some form of constraint by either limiting the
miner’s ability to choose a block size or the users ability to set a price.
The prevailing approach, used in protocols such as Bitcoin and Ethereum,
is to set an explicit absolute limit on the block size and let the users freely
bid for a place in a block, resulting in what is effectively a first price auc-
tion9. The literature around this pricing mechanism and its application in
blockchain technology has identified a number of weaknesses and alterna-
tive mechanisms. However, a block producer’s freedom to select transactions
combined with the existence of third channel payments renders many of these
mechanisms unenforceable. We will now discuss some of the most common
ones and show how our proposal clearly extends the set of pricing mechanisms
that can be employed.
Decoupling mining rewards: when the Bitcoin protocol fully transitions
to transaction fee-based block rewards, miners may no longer be incentivised
to mine on the longest chain. Intuitively, this arises when the shorter alter-
native chain includes blocks that contain lower total transaction fees. The
availability of a larger number of high-value transactions means that mining
a block on the shorter chain can lead to a higher reward for the miner. This
can decrease chain stability due to increased forking, lead to equilibria with
partially empty blocks and increase the gains from selfish-mining strategies
[34]. By decoupling miners’ rewards from their blocks, this misalignment of
incentives can be removed. This idea has been explored by a few crypto-
curencies, such as Ouroboros [29] and Fruitchains [26]. The idea here is that
miners are instead rewarded based on the block rewards of a sequence of Q
blocks. While this solves the outlined problem by making them indifferent as
to which block contains a particular transaction (within the defined window
Q), it suffers from two other issues: first, it reduces the marginal return of a
miner with regard to a specific transaction, reducing the incentive to include
the highest-paying transactions and to build blocks with the highest possible
reward (with Q approaching infinity the miner would become increasingly
indifferent between the alternatives of creating an empty and a block full of
transactions). Furthermore, the block producer can now profit from collud-
9In practice, users are motivated by the time required for the transaction to be entered
into a block. This wider competition for space in block’s that are being produced at a
constant rate has been shown to be a Vickery-Clark-Groves mechanism
7
ing with transaction senders: instead of sending a transaction with a fee f ,
the sender can directly pay the producer f − ǫ and send the transaction to
the network with a negligible fee ǫ. As the proposer cannot freely choose the
transactions in the block, this type of indirect payment cannot be prevented.
Share mining rewards between different functions: Many protocols have
developed more complex differentiation between different network functions,
such as block proposing and voting [25], or including off-chain blocks [28, 35].
In many cases, it would be desirable to directly link these functions to the
block fees and in the absence of inflation based block rewards this is a ne-
cessity. However, by awarding non-block producing roles with a share x of
the rewards, we reduce the reward of the producer to (1 − x) of the full
block reward. This approach reduces the incentive for including transactions
in a block, similarly to the decoupling approach, and leads to the same out-
come where a block producer can gain by colluding with a transaction sender
through third-channel payments.
kth price auctions: first price auctions require complex and inefficient
strategies to deduce a good bid [36]. A classical alternative are kth price
auctions: as a higher bid does not marginally affect the resulting fee, the
simple optimal strategy is to bid one’s true willingness to pay [18]. The reason
this has not been implemented in existing blockchains is its vulnerability to
collusion: a block producer can bribe a transaction sender, who is willing to
pay a fee f to instead send their transaction with a fee f +∆ and privately
refund them with the bribe ∆. This raises the price for everyone else while
still reaping fees from the low paying transactions10 [37]. While this strategy
does not depend on the block producer’s monopoly, it quickly becomes costly
if the block producer does not receive 100% of the transaction fees of the
block. This in turn depends on limiting the producers freedom, as outlined
above.
Algorithmic pricing: the alternative to limiting the block size and al-
lowing users decide the transaction fee they bid is to instead prescribe an
algorithm on the protocol level that determines the price of a given transac-
tion. While some discussions of this exist [37, 25], we are not aware of any
implementations. The main difficulty stems from finding a price that reflects
10Even simpler, excluding some low-fee transactions, the block producers could simply
include dummy transactions to themselves with high transaction fees to raise the price
level to a (for themselves) more optimal level.
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the externalities a transaction imposes on the system. These externalities
include, but is not limited to: security, processing and bandwidth cost for
all nodes currently online, and the long-term storage cost of maintaining
the state for every node. Crucially, due to these externalities, the optimal
price depends not only on characteristics of the transaction itself (such as
byte size or in the case of a smart contract complexity), but on all the other
transactions submitted to the system. While this direction is promising, it
still requires further research. A potential benefit of our proposed protocol
could be that, by first establishing consensus on collectively added transac-
tions, all participants essentially create a “common memory pool”, on top of
which pricing algorithms could be applied. This might enable the algorithm
to take into account statistics that would otherwise only exist outside of the
protocol, such as the current demand and congestion.
Empty blocks: In situations where (inflation-financed) block rewards make
up the largest part of the block reward, the race between block producers,
and the resulting risk of a block becoming an orphan, can make it more
profitable to publish smaller blocks that propagate faster than full blocks
that include the additional transaction fees [8, 21]. While this maximises
the miner’s rewards, it is obviously socially undesirable. By constraining the
proposer’s ability to select the transactions and decoupling the attachers’
incentives from the propagation time of the block, this behaviour can be
made unprofitable.
4.2. Censorship
If we assume that the attachers of vertices have a different identity to the
proposers or notarizers of the DAG, the exclusion of a specific transaction
requires the proposer to forgo the fees of all vertices that build upon vertices
containing this transaction. However, anonymity means that a participant
can create multiple identities and therefore participate in both groups or, in
absence of this, attachers and proposers could collude to attach alternative
vertices including all but the censored transaction11. This would allow the
proposer to simply ignore the vertices appended by other attachers, bringing
us back to a monopoly over the next block.
To prevent the this situation from occurring, and to make the proposals
a fair representation of the collectively built vertices, it would make sense to
11An alternative would be to restrict the size of a vertex, but avoiding hard-coded rules
is generally desirable.
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provide incentives to force proposers to maximise the number of descendants
of the selected vertices12. As noted earlier, this is still almost equivalent to
maximising the fee covered, but strips away the proposer’s power to decide
alone on the block content.
Given a global view of the DAG, this objective can easily be enforced.
However, abandoning the synchronicity assumption, this becomes non-trivial
as we cannot ensure that every participant will reach the same conclusion
about the optimal decision within a finite time. Nonetheless, we can im-
plement approximations of this selection rule. In doing so, we differentiate
between soft (incentive based) and hard constraints:
a) Hard constraints: impose a function f(nvertices, x) that any proposal
has to satisfy, where nvertices = |A|, i.e. the theoretical maximum
number of vertices that could be covered. The main difficulty in this
approach is that the effective maximum in a given round varies with
the structure of the DAG in that round. The function f can either be
a simple requirement of the number of descendants to be a minimum
percentage of vertices or a more complex approximation of the effective
maximum. Critically, it can only depend on further inputs x that are
verifiable even with a partial view of the DAG. While a very promising
direction, defining a robust rule with guaranteed and non-interactive
resolution under all circumstances will require further research.
b) Soft constraint: reward the proposer proportionate to
δ =
ndescendants
nvertices
,
where again nvertices = |A|, and ndescendants is the number of descendants
of the proposal. The cost of circumventing the DAG will quickly grow
proportional to the depth of any vertex the proposer wants to ignore.
Note that this introduces an element that is outside of the proposer’s
control, as the best δ achievable in a given round depends on both
the attacher and the network delays that occurred in this round. This
does come at the cost of increased volatility of an individual proposer’s
rewards. However, the possibility to now more broadly distribute the
12In protocols where each identity represents a fixed stake, as required for many VRFs,
this coincides with the maximisation of the total stake associated with the DAG.
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rewards can still result in an overall lower volatility, when taking into
consideration the different roles of a staker.
While both types of constraints ensure that a profit-maximising agent will
choose to maximise the number of descendants and thereby enable the ad-
vantages outlined in section 4.1, only the hard constraint makes it impossible
to ignore specific vertices within the DAG. Since under the soft constraint
it is possible that an attacker’s gain from censorship will be larger than the
economic loss of the rewards from the round.
A third alternative would be a competitive protocol, which optimises the
throughput of the network, where the vertex-proposals are ranked according
to a function of the proposer’s ranking and the number of descendants. This
encourages proposers to make maximal use of their knowledge of the DAG
for fear of losing out on the block reward.
4.3. Efficiency and Throughput
Most existing blockchains, including Ethereum and Bitcoin, combine the
role of adding new transactions and defining the order between them. This
coupling is a major limitation of both block size and the block production
rate. Increasing either property leads to an increase in the forking rate and
thereby reduces the proportion of byzantine participants β that the protocol
can tolerate. These relationships and tradeoffs have been studied extensively
for the Bitcoin protocol [35, 38, 39]. While more recent protocols, such as
GHOST [35], have altered the fork choice rule to incorporate “uncle blocks”,
a similar tradeoff between the block production rate and β exists. In this
case the system becomes vulnerable to balancing attacks [40], in which an at-
tacker splits the work of honest nodes into equal subtrees. By decoupling the
addition of new transactions from block production (delaying specification of
the final ordering), this constraint can be lifted, which allows transactions to
be added much more rapidly. Switching from a stochastic block production
rate to comparably deterministic block times dictated by the random bea-
con further alleviates this tradeoff. The nature of the DAG then allows the
communication of proposals for the set of vertices to be propagated quickly,
as they imply all vertices in their past.
The reduction in bandwidth from this can be calculated as follows: let
us assume we would like to achieve ntps transactions per second, and the
block time is tblock. At a bare minimum this requires the propagation of
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vertices, assuming each 32 byte transaction hash appears in the DAG only
once, during each round involves
BDAG = (32ntpstblock + 129nvertices) bytes ,
where the coefficient in front of nvertices contains the size of a signature and
two transaction hashes, which are the links for the vertex. A compact block13,
ignoring the block header, containing the same set of transactions has size
6ntpstblock bytes. Assuming that there are an O(1) number of block proposals
each round, and neglecting the size of tip proposals, the gains in terms of
bandwidth from the DAG are of O(1) (meaning, that it is constant and does
not depend on the number of transactions) and come from the fact that
BDAG is not sent through the network in a single event but is synchronised
continuously over the entire period of the round.
As mentioned in section 3, in order to maximise the throughput of the
system, the protocol should incentivise the vertex-attachers to create a com-
pact DAG from which the vertex-proposer can easily maximise the number of
descendants. The choice of committee members for vertex-attachers allows
for various incentivisation schemes depending on whether this group consists
of all users or is a random subset. In the former case, the incentives align
with those of IOTA and Byteball where vertex-attachers are naturally incen-
tivised to attach vertices to the DAG without a reward (as they will contain
their own transactions), and they will choose to implement the algorithm
that maximises the probability of their transactions being included in the
next block. In the latter case, to avoid a tragedy-of-the-commons situation
and to maximise the transaction throughput it is necessary to either reward
the vertex-attachers, or punish i.e. through stake slashing [42], the nodes that
do not cooperate.
In order to evaluate the effectiveness of these strategies, we simulated the
construction of a DAG using various algorithms to append vertices, varying
also the size of the group allowed to attach vertices to the DAG. Four different
algorithms were studied:
13A compact block introduced in Bitcoin [41] replaces the list of transactions in a block
with a list of 6 byte hashes, vastly reducing the data transmitted through the network.
The idea utilises the fact that the memory pools between nodes generally contain the same
transactions and therefore propagating full transactions in blocks is mostly redundant. In
this scheme, any node that does not possess the transaction corresponding to a hash in
the compact block, can simply query its peers for the information.
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Algorithm Type
Vertex Proposal Size
nvertices = 10 nvertices = 100 nvertices = 1000
Random 2 15 144
Joint Cardinality 2 24 308
Greedy 2 20 209
Metropolis 2 15 145
Table 1: The average size of a vertex proposal across 100 blocks for each DAG construction
algorithm for nvertices = 10, 100, 1000. In this simulation tips of the DAG are discarded
if they are older than 10 block rounds.
• Random: the tips are chosen randomly from available orphans.
• Joint cardinality : the pair of tips which have the maximum joint span of
vertices, also referred to as the cardinality, is chosen. More concretely,
the union of the two sets of descendants is taken and its size considered.
• Metropolis : pairs of tips are chosen at random until the joint cardinality
of the tips is within the threshold of the total number of vertices.
• Greedy : links are chosen by maximising cardinality on each link sep-
arately. First one tip is selected, and then the second is selected by
considering the cardinalities of the remaining tips. This differs from
the joint cardinality algorithm in that the set of descendants of each
tip are considered separately even though the same elements may ap-
pear in both.
The size of the vertex proposals required to capture all vertices ap-
pended in the previous round are shown in table 1 and shows that allowing a
large committee of vertex-attachers significantly increases the size of vertex-
proposals that are needed to specify the DAG. It is therefore more beneficial
for the efficiency of the system to restrict vertex-attachers to a small fraction
of staked nodes to balance security of the system with the feasibility of vertex
proposal by maximising the number of descendants.
5. Conclusions
In this article we have proposed a new DAG-based consensus protocol
which leverages the separation of functions to both minimise agency and
maximise throughput.
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We describe incentive incompatibilities and restrictions stemming from
the monopolistic power of a block producer to select transactions, once they
have won the right to produce the next block. By restricting their freedom to
do so, we eliminate issues that prevent existing protocols from implementing
a range of fee pricing mechanisms. We further discuss different approaches to
incentivise or enforce collective block construction in asynchronous networks.
While more research is needed to proof the security and efficiency of these
new approaches, the strict increase in enforceable pricing schemes opens up
new opportunities to extract the fees necessary to secure a decentralised
system in the absence of inflation-financed block rewards.
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